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CRIMINAL DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC INSULT 
LAWS IN THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND: THE 
CURTAILING OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
Michael T. Moran* 
The Polish government and judiciary continue to enforce the criminal 
defamation and public insult laws enumerated in the Polish Penal Code, 
thereby significantly infringing upon an individual’s constitutional right 
to freedom of expression. With respect to striking a fair balance between 
freedom of expression and an individual’s right to a protected reputation, 
criminal sanctions for defamation and public insult employ a chilling 
effect upon freedom of expression and spawn self-censorship concerning 
open public discourse. While countries across the European continent 
continue to maintain criminal penalties for defamation and insult, Poland 
diverges from this trend because the Polish legal system regularly 
enforces these laws, especially when the case involves public officials 
with political power. Meanwhile, the European Court of Human Rights 
has yet to formally reject criminal sanctions for defamation, thereby 
allowing Member States to curtail freedom of expression. This Note 
examines prospective legal proposals to amend the current defamation 
system in Poland. Then, this Note argues that civil judgments are equally 
effective in remedying a plaintiff’s damages in a defamation action 
because they do not detrimentally impact and stigmatize a defendant’s 
personal and professional reputation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2011, officers from Poland’s Internal Security Agency raided 
Robert Frycz’s residence after obtaining a search warrant from a local 
prosecutor’s office.1 Officers confiscated Frycz’s laptop and shut down 
his website2 that featured computer games such as “Komor Killer,” 
which showcased former Polish President Bronislaw Komorowski being 
shot by virtual vegetables.3 From the outset, Frycz argued that the 
website was meant to be satirical.4 He was found guilty and convicted of 
insulting the Polish Head of State, and his sentence included both a 
restriction of liberty, which prohibited Frycz from changing his 
permanent address without the court’s permission,5 and a court order to 
complete 600 hours of community service.6
In general, criminal defamation law is a fiercely contested freedom of 
expression issue in Poland and across the European continent because 
even the mere threat of criminal liability places a significant “constraint 
on public debate and the freedom of the press.”7 A genuine constitutional 
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of Pittsburgh at Bradford. The author would like to thank Professor Kevin Saunders for 
the thoughtful insight, feedback, and encouragement throughout the writing process. The 
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1 Man Convicted of Insulting Polish President, THE WARSAW VOICE (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/articlePrint.php/22223/news. 
2. Id.
3. Court Finds Man Guilty of Insulting Polish President on ‘Satirical’ Web Site,
RADIO POL. (Sept. 15, 2012, 8:30 AM), 
http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/112235,Court-finds-man-guilty-of-insulting-Polish-
president-on-satirical-web-site. 
4. Man Convicted of Insulting Polish President, supra note 1.
5. Court Finds Man Guilty of Insulting Polish President on ‘Satirical’ Web Site,
supra note 3. 
6. Man Convicted of Insulting Polish President, supra note 1. The Organisation
for Security and Co-operation in Europe criticized Poland for Frycz’s sentence and stated 
that criminal sanctions for insulting heads of state are outdated in modern democracies. 
See Blogger Charged with Insulting Polish President, RADIO POL. (Jan. 16, 2013, 3:00 
PM), http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/124311,Blogger-charged-with-insulting-Polish-
president. 
7. Polish Rights Ombudsman Criticises Criminal Defamation Despite
Campaign, Notorious Art. 212 Remains in Force, INT’L PRESS INST. (July 16, 2015), 
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guarantee concerning free expression is a relatively new legal 
phenomenon in the Republic of Poland because government-sponsored 
censorship was not abolished until April 1990, which coincided with the 
former Soviet satellite state’s communist-inspired government crumbling 
in favor of a Western-style democracy.8 Under the former regime, 
criminal provisions for defamation and insult were utilized as 
governmental devices to stifle individual speech and “justify repression 
of the democratic opposition” that existed within Communist Poland.9 
This Note will explore criminal defamation laws and its subset of 
public insult laws in the Republic of Poland and provide legal proposals 
for the country to implement in place of the current criminal law 
provisions.10 This Note will first articulate the succinct history of 
communism and totalitarianism in Poland and then briefly discuss the 
country’s accession into the European Union and Council of Europe 
following the collapse of communism.11 Next, this Note will examine 
Polish national courts’ overall compliance with Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, to which Poland is a contracting 
party.12 Then, this Note will introduce legal proposals to alter existing 
defamation law in Poland; these proposals range from judicial refusal to 
enforce these criminal laws in favor of civil litigation, legislative 
amendments to the Polish Penal Code to decriminalize defamation 
actions, and adoption of either the American or British approaches to 
defamation law.13 Subsequently, each proposal will be carefully 
  
http://legaldb.freemedia.at/2015/07/16/polish-rights-ombudsman-criticises-criminal-
defamation/ [hereinafter Polish Rights Ombudsman Criticises Criminal Defamation]. 
 8. Wojciech Sadurski, Freedom of the Press in Postcommunist Poland, 10 EAST 
EUR. POL. & SOCIETIES 439, 439 (1996). 
 9. Id. at 442. 
 10. See infra Parts II.B., IV. 
 11. See infra Parts II.A., II.C. 
 12. See infra Part III. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, a 
contracting party is afforded national sovereignty; however, to be a contracting party to 
the Convention, “acceptance of the jurisdiction of the [European] Court [of Human 
Rights] became compulsory” to ensure that any alleged Convention violations would be 
heard before the Court. Frank Emmert & Chandler Piché Carney, The European Union 
Charter of Fundamental Rights vs. The Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms - A Comparison, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1047, 1056–57 
(2017). 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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evaluated, and the best alternative will be selected, while being cognizant 
of the contemporary Polish legal and historical landscape.14 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Brief Polish History: Post-World War I to Present 
Throughout the twentieth century and the onset of the twenty-first 
century, Poland—a Central European nation nestled among the Western 
and Eastern European hegemonies—endured an unparalleled geopolitical 
experience in comparison to the country’s western and eastern 
neighbors.15 Following centuries of battling for a national identity 
because of the competing hegemonic powers to the east, west, and 
south,16 Poland did not reemerge onto the international scene until 1918 
when it became an independent sovereign subsequent to the Allied 
Powers defeating the Central Powers in World War I.17 However, Polish 
independence came to an abrupt halt when Adolf Hitler’s German army 
invaded the country on September 1, 1939, sparking the beginning of 
World War II.18 Following the demise of Nazi Germany in World War II, 
post-war Poland—known as the Polish People’s Republic—failed to 
achieve independence and was under the dominion of an authoritarian 
and communist-inspired “illegitimate puppet government,” which 
operated at the behest of the Soviet Union from 1945–1989.19 While 
under the dominion of the Soviet Union, freedom of expression was 
severely restricted, as the criminal codes throughout the Soviet bloc 
  
 14. See infra Parts V., VI. 
 15. See generally BRIAN PORTER-SZÜCS, POLAND IN THE MODERN WORLD: 
BEYOND MARTYRDOM 1–4 (2014). 
 16. See generally Piotr S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–
1918, in 7 A HISTORY OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 1, 10–11 (Peter F. Sugar & Donald W. 
Treadgold eds., 1996) (discussing the three late eighteenth century partitions of Poland by 
the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians, thereby eliminating an independent Poland off the 
European map). 
 17. PORTER-SZÜCS, supra note 15, at 71. 
 18. Id. at 144. 
 19. Id. at 186–87. 
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carried severe criminal penalties for defamation and insult.20 During the 
Communist era, criminal defamation and insult laws were routinely 
enforced, and an individual convicted of defaming Soviet authorities 
often received a seven-year prison sentence.21 Vladimir Lenin believed 
freedom of expression was a threat to the government, assuming that the 
bourgeoisie would use modes of communication—such as the press—to 
undermine and overthrow the government.22  
The Polish legal and political landscape underwent the process of 
democratization in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and Central and 
Eastern European Communism,23 at which point a non-communist 
democratic government was elected by the people and instituted in 
Poland.24 By 1997, eight years after the fall of Communism, the Polish 
government adopted a new constitution for the newly independent 
Republic.25 However, Communism did not completely fall as “the specter 
of totalitarianism continues” to loom26 since Poland is one of nine 
European Union Member States that continues to enforce insult as a 
criminal offense with the potential for imprisonment against individuals, 
particularly journalists and other members of the media.27 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, countries around the world 
expected the former Soviet bloc countries to follow the lead of either the 
United States—which limits defamation judgments to civil liability—or 
Western Europe—which is relatively lax on enforcing criminal 
  
 20. See Elena Yanchukova, LL.M. Comment, Criminal Defamation and Insult 
Laws: An Infringement on the Freedom of Expression in European and Post-Communist 
Jurisdictions, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861, 883 (2003). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 870. 
 23. See Daniel H. Cole, From Renaissance Poland to Poland’s Renaissance, The 
Struggle for Constitutionalism in Poland, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2092 (1999). 
 24. See PORTER-SZÜCS, supra note 15, at 321. 
 25. See Cole, supra note 23, at 2092. 
 26. Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 870; see also Cole, supra note 23, at 2065 
(commenting that “[m]uch of the developmental path of societies is conditioned by their 
past”). 
 27. SCOTT GRIFFEN, OUT OF BALANCE: DEFAMATION LAW IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW FOR JOURNALISTS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLICYMAKERS 
15 (Jan. 2015), http://legaldb.freemedia.at/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/IPI-
OutofBalance-Final-Jan2015.pdf. Only five of these Member States have repealed their 
criminal defamation laws, and only Romania has completely eliminated defamation-
related provisions from its criminal code. Id. at 10. 
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defamation and insult laws by deferring to a vigorous belief in freedom 
of expression.28 Nonetheless, Poland chose to follow neither the 
American nor Western European approach with respect to defamation 
law, and various Western outlets have taken note of it, including the 
United States’ Department of State.29 In Poland’s 2014 and 2015 Human 
Rights Report, the Department of State indicated that “[c]riminal 
defamation laws restricted freedom of speech and press by discouraging 
speech, publications, and material on the internet critical of public 
officials.”30 The 2015 Human Rights Report indicated that in 2014, 2 
individuals were convicted of insulting “constitutional organs of the 
government,” and 20 individuals were convicted of defamation, which 
resulted in the defendants paying fines.31 Although the maximum penalty 
was not imposed in any of these instances, the Helsinki Human Rights 
Foundation warned that “the risk of facing criminal charges may 
discourage [people] from addressing sensitive subjects.”32 When issuing 
Poland’s Human Rights Report, the United States Department of State 
was alarmed at Poland’s enforcement of, and subsequent prosecution of 
individuals under the, criminal defamation and pubic insult laws, which 
in turn unduly curb freedom of expression.33 The likely rationale for the 
Department of State’s trepidation with respect to Polish defamation law 
predictably stems from the American judiciary’s broad interpretation of 
the First Amendment of the American Constitution, which guarantees 
freedom of expression.34 
  
 28. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 883–84. 
 29. See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R., and Lab., 
Poland 2015 Human Rights Report (2015), https://pl.usembassy.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/23/2016/04/hrr2015.pdf [hereinafter Poland 2015 Human Rights 
Report]. 
 30. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R., and Lab., Poland 2014 
Human Rights Report 1 (2014), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236776.pdf; see also Poland 2015 Human 
Rights Report, supra note 29, at 1. 
 31. Poland 2015 Human Rights Report, supra note 29, at 11. Of the twenty 
individuals convicted, three individuals were members of the mass media and seventeen 
individuals were not members of the media. Id. 
 32. Id. at 10–11. 
 33. See id. at 1. 
 34. See generally What Does Free Speech Mean?, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-
outreach/activity-resources/what-does (last visited Feb. 14, 2017) (providing examples of 
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Scholars communicate the idea that international observers should not 
be surprised that countries of the former Soviet bloc have not created and 
enforced carbon copies of constitutions or laws that are followed in the 
United States and Western Europe.35 However, Central and Eastern 
European nations have looked to their influential Western European 
neighbors and their constitutional models in order to amalgamate with 
“the family of Europe.”36 Nevertheless, Poland continues to impose 
criminal liability for disseminating disparaging remarks against the 
Polish nation itself or its public officials—even in a “post-communist era 
for the kind of [free and uncensored] speech”37 that is inherently 
guaranteed and protected under the Polish Constitution.38 
B. Criminal Liability for Defamation and Public Insult 
The Polish Constitution of 1997 enumerates similar individual rights 
and liberties that Western democracies have successfully implemented 
and judicially interpreted.39 Specifically, the Polish Constitution contains 
several provisions that assure an individual’s freedom of expression, 
  
American case law on freedom of expression and the various modes of constitutionally 
protected speech); see generally U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”). 
 35. Symposium, Constitutional “Refolution” in the Ex-Communist World: The 
Rule of Law, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 45, 54 (1997) [hereinafter Constitutional 
“Refolution” in the Ex-Communist World: The Rule of Law]. 
 36. Id. at 55–56. For example, some correlations can be deduced between 
Poland’s 1997 Constitution and France’s 1957 Constitution. Compare KONSTYTUCJA 
RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND] Apr. 2, 
1997, art. 2 (Pol.) [hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND], with 
1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.) (stating generally that both nations shall be democratic states that 
honor the rule of law and respect the rights of all citizens). 
 37. Constitutional “Refolution” in the Ex-Communist World: The Rule of Law, 
supra note 35, at 56. 
 38. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, art. 54, §§ 1–2 
(guaranteeing one’s constitutional right to freedom of expression and abolishing 
preventive governmental censorship in the Polish state). 
 39. Compare id. art. 32 (Pol.) (stating that “[a]ll persons shall be equal before the 
law”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). 
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including Article 14 and Article 54.40 However, given these 
constitutional provisions and their respective guaranteed rights, Article 
212 of the Polish Penal Code states: 
Whoever imputes to another person, a group of persons, an institution 
or organisational unit not having the status of a legal person, such 
conduct, or characteristics that may discredit them in the face of public 
opinion or result in a loss of confidence necessary for a given position, 
occupation or type to activity shall be subject to a fine, the penalty of 
restriction of liberty or the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to 
one year. If the perpetrator commits the act specified in § 1 through the 
mass media shall be subject to a fine, the penalty of restriction of 
liberty or the penalty of deprivation of liberty for up to [two] years.41 
Additionally, Article 216 of the Polish Penal Code dictates: 
Whoever insults another person in his presence, or [even in his 
absence], or with the intention that the insult shall reach such a person, 
shall be subject to a fine or the penalty of restriction of liberty. 
Whoever insults another person using the mass media, shall be subject 
to a fine, the penalty of restriction of liberty or the penalty of 
deprivation of liberty for up to one year.42 
Specifically, Section 2 of Article 135 of the Polish Penal Code 
criminalizes publicly insulting the Polish president and subjects those 
convicted to a maximum penalty of imprisonment of three years.43 
Moreover, Polish prosecutors lack discretion when individual expression 
“offends the dignity of [the] president” and are compelled to pursue 
  
 40. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, arts. 14, 54 (Article 14 
states, “The Republic of Poland shall ensure freedom of the press and other means of 
social communication,” and Article 54 states, “Preventive censorship of the means of 
social communication and the licensing of the press shall be prohibited”). 
 41. KODEKS KARNY [KK] [THE PENAL CODE] art. 212, §§ 1–2 (Pol.), 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/10 (emphasis 
added) (outlining criminal liability for defamation). 
 42. Id. art. 216, §§ 1–2 (emphasis added) (outlining criminal liability for public 
insult).  
 43. Id. art. 135, § 2. 
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criminal charges even if the president is not personally offended.44 
Although similar criminal defamation provisions are present in other 
European nations’ criminal codes,45 the Polish provision is 
distinguishable because insults against the president still potentially 
result in a criminal prosecution and conviction.46 Another major 
distinction from other European countries is that the Polish Constitution 
provides the president with extensive political powers.47 In contrast, other 
European countries that apply similar criminal provisions for defamation 
do so to protect members of their royal families,48 who merely act as 
head of state figureheads and do not exert significant political power or 
influence.49  
Generally, defamation laws are implemented “to protect the 
reputations of individuals against injury.”50 In furtherance of this general 
  
 44. Helena O’Rourke-Potocki, Polish Jokes Are No Laughing Matter, POLITICO 
(Jan. 29, 2016, 1:19 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-humor-satrire-duda-
tusk-zabawny-kuc/. In some instances, the president will intervene and urge prosecutors 
to discontinue investigating the criminal charges against the defendant. See Joanna Gill, 
Beyond a Joke: Seven Countries Where It’s a Criminal Offence to Insult a Head of State, 
EURONEWS, http://www.euronews.com/2016/04/15/beyond-a-joke-7-countries-where-is-
it-a-criminal-offence-to-insult-a-head-of (last updated Apr. 15, 2016). 
 45. Czech Lawmakers Seek to Make Defaming the President a Crime, REUTERS 
(Nov. 15, 2016, 11:47 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-law-defamation-
idUSKBN13A27S. 
 46. See Poland Should Abolish Criminal Defamation, Says OSCE Media 
Freedom Representative Following Conviction of Editor, ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-
OPERATION IN EUR. (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.osce.org/fom/93797. 
 47. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, art. 126, § 1 (“The 
President of the Republic of Poland shall be the supreme representative of the Republic 
of Poland and the guarantor of the continuity of State authority.”); see also id. arts. 133–
34, 136–44 (vesting additional political powers with the Polish president). 
 48. See CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 490(3) (Spain) (“Whoever 
commits slander or defamation against the King . . . , the Queen . . . the Regent or any 
member of the Regency, or the Heir to the Throne, . . . shall be punished with a sentence 
of imprisonment of six months to two years.”). 
 49. See Caitlin Dewey & Max Fisher, Meet the World’s Other 25 Royal Families, 
WASH. POST (July 22, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/07/22/meet-the-worlds-
other-25-royal-families/?utm_term=.e54d62cd3491. 
 50. Decriminalisation of Defamation, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/defamation (last visited Oct. 20, 2016); 
see also Defamation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining defamation as 
the “[m]alicious or groundless harm to the reputation or good name of another by the 
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definition, the Polish Constitutional Court previously upheld the 
country’s public insult law51 concerning insults against the president 
because of the solemn character of the presidency, which mandates that 
the president of the Republic should “be treated with respect and 
veneration.”52 The Polish Constitutional Court asserted that “[s]howing 
disdain by means of offensive and humiliating utterances . . . do[es] not 
fall into the categories of truth and falsehood . . . [and] may not be 
regarded as an element of acceptance criticism of the President of the 
Republic of Poland.”53 Furthermore, the Court held that freedom of 
expression is to be protected with respect to the content, not the form, if 
the communication is offensive or humiliating.54 The Court indicated that 
such criticism was not “an acceptable standard in a democratic state,” 
and if citizens wish to participate in the public debate, they must 
  
making of a false statement to a third person . . . and [a] false written or oral statement 
that damages another’s reputation”). 
 51. See Constitutional Tribunal Advisory Opinion, Article 135(2) of the Act of 6 
June 1997 – the Penal Code (Journal of Laws - Dz. U. No. 88, item 553, as amended) is 
Consistent with Article 54(1) in Conjunction with Article 31(3) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland, as well as with Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Done at Rome on 4 November 1950 (Journal 
of Laws -Dz. U. of 1993 No. 61, item 284, as amended), TRYBUNAŁ KONSTYTUCYJNY 
(July 6, 2011), ¶¶ 3.2–3.4, 4.3, 
http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/P_12_09_en.pdf [hereinafter 
Constitutional Tribunal Advisory Opinion] (affirming “[t]he freedom to express opinions 
. . . is not absolute in character and may be subject to restrictions” and penalizing public 
insult of the President of the Republic of Poland “does not hinder possible criticism . . . 
and the course of the public debate”). Unlike the United States federal system—which 
prohibits federal courts from entertaining and issuing advisory opinions—the Polish 
Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court to hear and issue advisory opinions on 
the constitutionality of legislative acts. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
POLAND, art. 193 (“Any court may refer a question of law to the Constitutional Tribunal 
as to the conformity of a normative act to the Constitution, ratified international 
agreements or statute, if the answer to such question of law will determine an issue 
currently before such court.”). 
 52. Press Release, Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Criminal Liability for the Public 
Insult of the President of the Republic of Poland (May 2013), 
http://trybunal.gov.pl/en/news/press-releases/after-the-hearing/art/2596-
odpowiedzialnosc-karna-za-publiczne-zniewazenie-prezydenta-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej/ 
[hereinafter Press Release, Criminal Liability for the Public Insult of the President]. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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communicate their viewpoints “in a civilised and polite manner.”55 In 
response to this ruling, the Council of Europe56 indicated “the mere fact 
[of criminal] sanctions” for defamation and the subsidiary offense of 
public insult “have substantial undesirable effects on freedom of 
expression and information.”57 In 2012, the imprisonment clause 
enumerated in Article 212 of the Polish Penal Code regarding criminal 
defamation was brought before the Polish Constitutional Court; however, 
the Court reaffirmed that criminal defamation—like public insult—was 
consistent with freedom of expression under the Polish Constitution and 
cited the earlier 2006 ruling to reject the advocate’s argument, which 
averred against a defendant’s imprisonment for merely exercising his 
constitutional right to freedom of expression.58 
Broadly speaking, defamation laws that criminally penalize slander 
(oral defamation) and libel (written defamation) are implemented “to 
protect the reputation of a person from harm caused by the dissemination 
of false information” by a third party.59 Criminal defamation has its 
philosophical and political foundations tracing back to the Middle Ages, 
when these laws were intended to maintain social order and control along 
with protecting power and privilege.60 Although defamation laws are 
widely known to protect public figures and institutions, they also exist to 
  
 55. Id.; see also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, art. 31, § 3 
(“Any limitation upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms and rights may be imposed 
. . . when necessary in a democratic state for the protection of its security or public order, 
. . . or the freedom and rights of other persons.”). However, a recently enacted Polish law 
states that individuals who imply that the Republic of Poland was responsible for 
carrying out the atrocities of the Holocaust during World War II could potentially be 
subject to three years imprisonment because such assertions would be an obvious 
“falsification of Polish history.” Todor Gardos, Poland’s Twisted Holocaust Law, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (Feb. 10, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/10/polands-
twisted-holocaust-law. 
 56. The Council of Europe should not be confused with the European Union or 
the European Union’s European Council; the Council of Europe is a separate 
supranational organization that “advocates freedom of expression and of the media” in 
addition to channeling human rights across its Member States and abroad. Values: 
Human Rights, Democracy, Rule of Law, COUNCIL OF EUR., 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
 57. Decriminalisation of Defamation, supra note 50. 
 58. Polish Rights Ombudsman Criticises Criminal Defamation, supra note 7. 
 59. Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 863. 
 60. Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in 
American Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433, 438 (2004). 
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protect private individuals and their respective reputations.61 However, 
the European Court of Human Rights has held that “[t]he limits of 
permissible criticism are wider with regard to the Government than in 
relation to a private citizen, or even a politician.”62 Additionally, insult 
laws are implemented solely to protect the honor and dignity of members 
of the government, public officials, and national symbols from ill-
mannered oral and written expression from the public and media.63 In 
fact, defamation and insult laws are distinguishable in that defamation 
focuses on a “false assertion of fact” whereas insult emphasizes 
“penaliz[ing] the truth.”64 
C. Polish Membership in the European Union and the Council of 
Europe 
Given the statutory restrictions in the Polish Penal Code and the 
potential for criminal sanctions for defamation and public insult, it is 
noteworthy that Poland has joined multiple global and regional 
supranational organizations following the country’s severance with 
authoritarian communism and its movement toward democracy.65 
Poland’s accession into the European Union occurred on May 1, 2004,66 
  
 61. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 863. 
 62. Castells v. Spain, App. No. 11798/85, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 445, 477 (1992). 
Other jurisdictions have similarly held that “[p]ublic officials and public figures usually 
enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence 
have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals . . 
. and the state interest in protecting [private individuals] is correspondingly greater.” 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). 
 63. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 863. 
 64. Id. at 863–64. 
 65. See U.S. Relations with Poland, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2875.htm (stating that Poland is a current Member 
State of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, 
and World Trade Organization). Regionally, Poland is a Member State of the Visegrad 
Group, which consists of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. See 
generally VISEGRAD GR., http://www.visegradgroup.eu/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2017). 
 66. Poland: Overview, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries/member-countries/poland_en#poland-in-the-eu (last updated Feb. 11, 2018). 
Other countries to join the European Union with Poland in 2004 included Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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and by becoming a European Union Member State, Poland agreed to 
bind itself to various treaties that the European Union expects Member 
States to implement and regularly enforce within their borders.67 
However, Poland has opted-out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union,68 which states, “Everyone has the right to freedom 
of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.”69 Specifically, the Polish opt-out 
clause of Article 1 prevents “the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
or any court or tribunal of Poland . . . to find that the laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland . . . are 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles that it 
reaffirms.”70 Shockingly, although regional organizations report 
countries across the European continent are trending toward abolishing 
criminal liability for defamation actions, only five European Union 
Member States have actually repealed the laws as an offense against 
private individuals.71 Although Italy appears to be the only European 
Union Member State to routinely imprison journalists for libel, recent 
research also confirms Polish courts have ordered prison sentences or 
suspended prison sentences for journalists and bloggers who were 
convicted of defamation.72 In particular, the Polish media continues to be 
“hindered by criminal defamation laws” and press censorship because 
  
Member Countries of the EU, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/countries_en (last updated Feb. 11, 2018). All of these countries (excluding Cyprus 
and Malta) were under the direct control of the Soviet Union following World War II. Id. 
 67. EU Treaties, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/law/treaties_en 
(last updated Feb. 11, 2018). 
 68. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 1, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 69. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 11(1), Dec. 18, 
2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 11 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]. The Charter of Rights became 
legally binding on all European Union Member States (excluding Poland and the United 
Kingdom) in December 2009 with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 70. TFEU art. 1. 
 71. GRIFFEN, supra note 27, at 10 (emphasis added). Of these five countries, only 
Romania has completely eliminated defamation-related provisions from its criminal code. 
Id. 
 72. Id. at 11. 
2018] Criminal Defamation and Public Insult Laws 589 
even the threat of criminal sanctions from these laws remains “one of the 
most significant potential threats to freedom of speech.”73 
Prior to joining the European Union, Poland became the twenty-fifth 
Member State of the Council of Europe in November 1991,74 and 
although the Council of Europe and the European Union “share the same 
fundamental values – human rights, democracy and the rule of law,” they 
are distinctly separate supranational entities with “different, yet 
complementary, roles.”75 The European Court of Human Rights is the 
governing judicial body of the Council of Europe; the Court is located in 
Strasbourg, France, thereby dubbing the Court’s decisions as 
“‘Strasbourg’ case-law.”76 The European Court of Human Rights’s 
longstanding and influential decisions on freedom of expression have 
captivated international courts on other continents, such as the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and the European Court’s persuasive 
jurisprudence has been used to resolve similar issues in front of these 
international courts.77 Unlike the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which is not legally binding on Poland,78 the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) is binding on the Polish 
government and national courts solely because the country is a sitting 
Member State of the Council of Europe.79 Thus, the European Court of 
  
 73. Iwona Lepka, Freedom of Expression in Post-Communist Poland, 37 J. 
SOCIALIST THEORY 619, 631 (2009). 
 74. Poland, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/poland (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2016). 
 75. The Council of Europe and the European Union: Different Roles, Shared 
Values, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/european-union (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2016). Additionally, the Council of Europe has 47 Member States, whereas the 
European Union consists of 28 Member States. Id. 
 76. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN EUROPE: CASE-LAW CONCERNING ARTICLE 10 OF 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 7 n.2 (Mario Oetheimer ed., 2007). 
 77. See Eduardo Andrés Bertoni, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and 
the European Court of Human Rights: A Dialogue on Freedom of Expression Standards, 
3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 332, 349–50 (2009). 
 78. See TFEU protocol 30. 
 79. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 
[hereinafter The Convention] (“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention.”); see also Poland and the European Court of Human Rights, PERMANENT 
REPRESENTATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POL. TO THE COUNCIL OF EUR., 
http://www.strasburgre.msz.gov.pl/en/poland_in_the_council_of_europe/poland_and_the
_european_court_of_human_rights/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (stating that Poland 
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Human Rights is granted jurisdiction over legal actions concerning 
possible Convention violations; citizens of Council of Europe Member 
States then initiate these legal proceedings against their respective 
countries via Article 19 of the Convention.80  
Article 10 of the Convention guarantees freedom of expression and 
states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers.”81 However, Article 10(2) of the Convention alludes to the idea 
that these freedoms are not limitless and “may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society . . . for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, . . . or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.”82 Despite the right to freedom of expression 
enumerated in the Convention, approximately 1,000 individuals are 
found guilty in Polish courts annually for defamation and insult.83 There 
were 6,654 cases reported to the police in 2005; 9,838 cases in 2010; 
11,174 cases in 2011; and 6,466 cases in 2012—approximately 10% to 
  
signed onto the Convention on January 19, 1993, acceded to the Convention’s protocols, 
and permitted Polish citizens to lodge applications with the European Court of Human 
Rights when citizens contended their human rights and fundamental freedoms were 
abridged by Poland and its agents). 
 80. The Convention, supra note 79, art. 19 (“To ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of Human Rights, . . . [and] [i]t 
shall function on a permanent basis.”); see also Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 754 (1976) (reaffirming that the Court “is responsible for 
ensuring the observance of those States’ engagements . . . [and] is empowered to give the 
final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ is reconcilable with freedom of 
expression as protected by Article 10”). 
 81. The Convention, supra note 79, art. 10(1). Note that the Article 10 provision 
in the Convention is nearly identical to the Article 11 provision within the European 
Union’s Charter of Rights. See Charter of Rights art. 11(1). 
 82. The Convention, supra note 79, art. 10(2). 
 83. Zoltán J. Tóth, The Regulation of Defamation and Insult in Europe, in 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 507, 509 
(András Koltay ed., 2015). Verbal and physical insults committed against public officials 
are included in this statistic. Id. 
2018] Criminal Defamation and Public Insult Laws 591 
20% of those defendants were subject to a criminal sentence upon 
conclusion of judicial proceedings.84 
III. POLAND AND ARTICLE 10 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Protecting Reputation Versus the Chilling Effect on Public 
Debate 
Article 10 of the Convention guarantees that individuals are 
unquestionably entitled to freedom of expression; however, the second 
section of Article 10 places formal restrictions on that right, particularly 
with respect to protecting and preserving an individual’s reputation from 
unsubstantiated public ridicule.85 One of the leading European Court of 
Human Rights cases deliberating this issue is Lingens v. Austria.86 In that 
case, via a television interview, the President of the Jewish 
Documentation Centre accused Friedrich Peter, President of the Austrian 
Liberal Party, of serving in Nazi Germany’s SS infantry brigade, which 
“massacred civilians behind the German lines in Russia” during World 
War II.87 Lingens published two articles in an Austrian magazine stating 
that Peter was “unacceptable as a politician in Austria” because of his 
past involvement with the infantry, which was never actually denied.88 
Lingens published a second article criticizing retiring Chancellor Bruno 
Kreisky for an “accommodating attitude towards former Nazis who had 
recently taken part in Austrian politics” and supporting Peter.89 Lingens’s 
article also criticized Austrian political parties for allowing former Nazis 
  
 84. Id. at 509 n.98. Overall, Polish courts convicted 738 individuals in 2005, 
1,064 in 2010, 1,270 in 2011, and 1,413 in 2012. Id. 
 85. See The Convention, supra note 79, art. 10(1)–(2); see also Stijn Smet, 
Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation: Human Rights in Conflict, 26 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 183, 192 (2010). 
 86. See generally Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, 
421 (1986) (holding unanimously that there was a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention). 
 87. Id. at 408. 
 88. Id. at 409. 
 89. Id. Lingens also stated, “In truth [retiring Chancellor] Kreisky’s behaviour 
cannot be criticised on rational grounds but only on irrational grounds: it is immoral, 
undignified.” Id. at 410. 
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to be their leaders.90 In response, then-Chancellor Kreisky brought 
private prosecutions against Lingens under the applicable criminal 
defamation provision in the Austrian Criminal Code.91  
Upon review of the case, the European Court of Human Rights 
reversed the Austrian Court of Appeal’s decision convicting Lingens and 
held Lingens’s Article 10 rights were violated.92 In the Court’s holding, it 
stated that freedom of expression is an essential foundation and the 
hallmark of a democratic society.93 Additionally, the Court indicated that 
Article 10(2) “is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb [and] [s]uch 
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness.”94 
Politicians, unlike private individuals, “lay[] [themselves] open to close 
scrutiny” with respect to their official actions, and they must “display a 
greater degree of tolerance” when criticized by the media and the 
public.95 Article 10 does indeed protect the reputation of others, 
including politicians acting in their public and private capacities, but 
such reputational protection must “be weighed in relation to the interests 
of open discussion of political issues.”96 Essentially, there must be a 
pressing social need if there is to be governmental interference, and the 
  
 90. Id. at 411. 
 91. Id.; see also Dean Chapman, Suppressing Dissent: The Pivotal Role of the 
Prosecutor in Criminal Defamation Proceedings in Countries Subject to the European 
Court of Human Rights, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 598 (2008) (commenting that “[b]y virtue 
of their positions, public figures—politicians, judges, police officers, even prosecutors 
themselves—are very well placed to invoke criminal defamation laws for their own 
protection”). In the United States, criminal prosecutions are brought publicly by the state 
under the theory of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 608 (1985). However, in many European jurisdictions, a victim of a crime may seek 
a private prosecution if the public prosecutor initially decides to drop charges against the 
defendant. See Challenging the Decision Not to Prosecute, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR 
FUNDAMENTAL RTS., http://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-
maps/comparative-data/victims-support-services/prosecution (last visited Jan. 1, 2018). 
 92. Lingens, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 414, 421 (affirming the Vienna Regional Court’s 
judgment). 
 93. Id. at 418. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 419. 
 96. Id. The European Court of Human Rights also deemed the press as the 
“purveyor of information and public watchdog” over public discussion and debate. Id. at 
420. 
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interference must be proportionate for there to be a justified breach of an 
individual’s Article 10 right to freedom of expression.97 
Article 10 of the Convention mandates that Member States must strike 
a fair balance between protecting “a good reputation, the right of access 
to justice, and the right to freedom of expression.”98 The European Court 
of Human Rights grants leniency and awards additional protection for 
defendants when defamatory statements are “uttered in an ironic or 
satirical manner.”99 Freedom of expression is violated when an ironic or 
satirical statement has “a minor impact on the reputation of the plaintiff, 
given the clearly humorous tone of the statement.”100 A recent July 2016 
case originating from Poland reinforces the European Court of Human 
Rights’ protection of ironic and satirical comments, while also 
exemplifying Polish courts’ continued enforcement of criminal 
defamation and insult laws to protect the reputations of Polish 
government officials.101 In that case, the defendant Ziembiński published 
an article that contained “the copious use of words such as ‘numbskull,’ 
‘dull boss,’ ‘dim-witted official,’ ‘poser’ and ‘populist,’” which led the 
plaintiffs—several public officials—to file a criminal complaint against 
Ziembiński for “lower[ing] them in public opinion and undermin[ing] the 
public confidence necessary for the discharge of their duties.”102 Instead 
of charging Ziembiński with criminal defamation under Article 212 of 
the Polish Criminal Code, the trial court convicted him under Article 216 
for criminal insult through the mass media.103 
  
 97. See Gavin Millar, Whither the Spirit of Lingens?, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
277, 288 (2009). Under this standard, “a healthy, modern democracy” requires “a robust, 
questioning media” without unnecessary governmental interference. Id. 
 98. Lord Lester, Free Speech Today, 33 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 129, 135 (2013). It 
is common ground that a criminal defendant’s conviction and punishment for defamation 
“constitute[] an interference . . . with her right to freedom of expression.” Lewandowska-
Malec v. Poland, App. No. 39660/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54 (2012). 
 99. Smet, supra note 85, at 211. 
 100. Id. at 212 (emphasis added). 
 101. See Ziembiński v. Poland (No. 2), App. No. 1799/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 16, 45 
(2016) (The Polish trial court held the media was not legally entitled “to criticise the 
actions of public officials . . . in a manipulative way to wage private wars.” However, the 
European Court of Human Rights indicated Ziembiński’s use of satire was within “the 
limits of admissible exaggeration.”). 
 102. Id. ¶ 9. 
 103. Id. ¶ 12. The Polish trial court indicated that the defendant’s actions 
constituted harm toward the plaintiffs’ honor and dignity, which led to the decision to 
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Upon hearing Ziembiński’s appeal and following numerous 
unsuccessful appeals at the Polish court system level, the European Court 
of Human Rights held there was a violation of Article 10 because “the 
interference with [Ziembiński’s] right to freedom of expression was 
disproportionate to the aim pursued, and was thus not ‘necessary in a 
democratic society.’”104 The Court noted that journalists are permitted 
within the scope of freedom of expression to use sarcasm and irony, even 
though freedom of expression is to be balanced against the right to 
private life.105 Therefore, the Court concluded, “a degree of exaggeration 
or even provocation is permitted,” which essentially permits journalists 
to a “degree of immoderation” in their publications.106 Moreover, the 
Court stated, “[S]atire is a form of artistic expression and social 
commentary which, by its inherent features of exaggeration and 
distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate.”107 
Additionally, near the conclusion of the Court’s holding, the Court 
skirted around the idea of condemning criminal defamation and insult 
laws that are implemented and enforced by Council of Europe Member 
States by stating: 
While the use of criminal-law sanctions in defamation cases is not in 
itself disproportionate . . . the nature and severity of the penalties 
imposed are factors to be taken into account, because they must not be 
such as to dissuade the press or others who engage in public debate 
from taking part in the discussion of matters of legitimate public 
concern.108 
Judges Wojtyczek and Kūris wrote a joint dissent in Ziembiński 
providing a captivating assessment when compared to the Opinion of the 
Court.109 The dissent states that international courts such as the European 
  
convict under the criminal insult provision instead of criminal defamation. Id. ¶ 16. 
Fortunately, the trial court did not impose a prison sentence for Ziembiński, as prison was 
considered a disproportionate penalty, and instead imposed a fine of 10,000 złotys. Id. ¶ 
18. 
 104. Id. ¶¶ 37, 47. 
 105. Id. ¶¶ 39, 44. 
 106. Id. ¶ 44. 
 107. Id. ¶ 45. 
 108. Id. ¶ 46 (emphasis added). 
 109. See generally id. (Wojtyczek & Kūris, JJ., dissenting). 
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Court of Human Rights must be cautious “in deciding to dismiss . . . 
findings by domestic courts [because] . . . certain words or phrases are 
authoritatively held to be beyond the limits of acceptability in a 
particular society.”110 Furthermore, the dissent emphasized that the Polish 
courts considered the insulting nature of the expressions used by 
Ziembiński, and an international court does not have the capacity or 
competencies to question either the legal determinations or the linguistic 
and cultural expertise of the Polish courts.111 However, observers 
following the case noted that the judges failed to cite to adequate 
authority in making their propositions because none of the cited cases in 
the dissent concerned defamation or insult convictions.112 In response to 
the assertions made by the dissenting judges, legal scholars noted that 
“[t]he beauty of the Strasbourg Court” is that the judges can step back 
from potentially partial decisions made by the national courts and 
deliberate “in a clear-headed fashion, keeping in mind the healthy, 
modern democracy as the ideal.”113 
Furthermore, a central concern for the European Court of Human 
Rights when determining whether there has been an Article 10 violation 
is to ensure that the national court decision did not produce a chilling 
effect with respect to legitimate public interest and debate.114 When 
delineating a criminal defamation or insult analysis, the Court applies a 
“most careful scrutiny” test for potential sanctions.115 A chilling effect 
arises when a private individual or journalist acting within the scope of 
his employment engages in “self-censorship,” meaning there is a fear on 
  
 110. Id. ¶ 3.  
 111. Id. 
 112. See Ronan Ó Fathaigh, Polish Mayor’s Private Prosecution of Local 
Journalist for Insult Violated Article 10: Ziembiński v. Poland (No. 2), STRASBOURG 
OBSERVERS (Aug. 12, 2016), https://strasbourgobservers.com/2016/08/12/polish-mayors-
private-prosecution-of-local-journalist-for-insult-violated-article-10-ziembinski-v-
poland-no-2/ (discussing that the cases cited by the dissenting judges concerned civil 
rather than criminal defamation, a conviction for publishing secret information, an 
injunction against reporting a person’s arrest, and an arrest for disobeying a police order). 
 113. Millar, supra note 97, at 288. 
 114. TARLACH MCGONAGLE, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND DEFAMATION: A 
STUDY OF THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 24 (Onur Andreotti 
ed., 2016). 
 115. See id. at 57. The synonymous term typically used in American jurisprudence 
is “strict scrutiny.” See generally Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict 
Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285 (2015). 
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the part of an individual of disproportionate sanctions, or an individual 
fears prosecution under overbroad laws.116 Essentially, a chilling effect 
“works to the detriment of society as a whole”117 because it exerts a 
deterrent effect on the public, particularly on journalists who will be 
reluctant to report on matters of public interest due to the threat of a 
criminal prosecution and potential conviction, which may adversely 
impact their right to practice journalism.118 Critics of criminal defamation 
and insult laws specify that “[t]he very fact of a criminal conviction, 
even where the penalties imposed for it are light, can be very detrimental 
as it imposes a criminal record on the person concerned, which in turn 
can have far-reaching personal and/or professional consequences.”119 
B. Imprisonment and Suspended Sentences Remain Possible 
Legal Consequences in Poland: Malisiewicz-Gąsior v. Poland 
The threat of imprisonment following a defamation or insult 
conviction and the impending chilling effect120 on private individuals and 
the media remain relevant in the Republic of Poland, as evidenced by 
Malisiewicz-Gąsior v. Poland.121 The European Commission of Human 
Rights brought this case to the European Court of Human Rights after 
Malisiewicz-Gąsior was convicted of defaming Andrzej Kern, the 
  
 116. Id. at 24. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list for when a chilling effect 
arises, but rather provide some examples for when it does arise. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 868. Yanchukova also notes that 
sometimes it is better for courts to “tolerate some excesses in expression, even where 
they may cause some harm, than to limit publication in the public interest,” even though 
national courts in emerging democracies (e.g., Central and Eastern Europe) do not decide 
in this manner. Id. (quoting Toby Mendel, The Right of the Public to Know and Freedom 
of Entertainment: Information Seen from the Consumer’s Angle, ARTICLE 19 (Sept. 23, 
1999), https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-information-foi-
vs.-privacy.pdf). 
 119. MCGONAGLE, supra note 114, at 56 (emphasis added). 
 120. See supra Part III.A. 
 121. See generally Malisiewicz-Gąsior v. Poland, App. No. 43797/98, 45 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 563, 571, 579 (2006); see also Chapman, supra note 91, at 598–99 (stating criminal 
defamation laws “are ripe for abuse by political officials” in that they improperly avail 
themselves of the “laws to insulate themselves from unfriendly commentary”). 
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Deputy Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland.122 In this 2006 
case, the defendant Malisiewicz-Gąsior was convicted of defamation 
because she published two articles in a newspaper and made allegations 
against Kern, a well-known political figure, who had allegedly abused 
his power while working in the Sejm.123 Kern initially requested criminal 
proceedings after alleging that the defendant and her husband kidnapped 
his teenage daughter who had a history of previously absconding from 
the Kern family home.124 Malisiewicz-Gąsior’s critical statements about 
Kern were broadcasted via radio and television stations while 
Malisiewicz-Gąsior campaigned as a candidate in the Polish 
parliamentary elections in 1993 against the grave injustices she suffered 
in “a western-style democracy [that] had just set in.”125 
The Polish national courts focused on the idea that Malisiewicz-
Gąsior’s statements were defamatory because “they debased the victim 
in the public opinion and exposed [Kern] to loss of the trust necessary to 
perform the functions of Deputy Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of 
Poland and other public functions.”126 Additionally, the Polish national 
courts ruled that Malisiewicz-Gąsior’s statements were false, and she did 
not “defend[] a socially justified interest” in achieving her private goals, 
which was to win a seat in the Polish Senate.127 Therefore, the Polish 
courts ruled on the basis of protecting the Sejm member’s overall official 
and personal reputation in light of the public eye and sentenced 
  
 122. Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 570. The Polish Sejm is the 
American comparable to the House of Representatives in Congress; the Sejm is the lower 
house, and the Senate is the upper house of the national legislature. See THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, art. 95, § 1. 
 123. Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 577. According to Malisiewicz-
Gąsior, Kern, the well-known politician, allegedly abused his power as a high-ranking 
member of the Sejm because Malisiewicz-Gąsior was “arrested groundlessly and 
[purposely] imprisoned” in a psychiatric cell, her home was searched for drugs, her 
telephone calls were tapped, and her car was damaged—each of these contributing to 
“constant mental pressure.” Id. at 568–69. In believing Kern overstepped the acceptable 
limits granted to him with respect to his position in the Sejm, Malisiewicz-Gąsior 
surmised that “such behaviour had been possible only in the Stalinist era.” Id. at 569. 
 124. Id. at 566.  
 125. Id. at 569, 577. 
 126. Id. at 577. 
 127. Id. 
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Malisiewicz-Gąsior to a one-year prison term suspended for three years 
along with ordering her to issue a public apology.128 
When the case was appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Court emphasized the importance of promoting free political debate, 
which is consistently affirmed as the core concept of a free democratic 
society.129 The Court noted that Malisiewicz-Gąsior’s comments about 
Kern were a result of her own personal experiences gained during the 
criminal proceedings initiated against her at the request of the 
politician.130 Therefore, the Court held the defendant’s statements about 
Kern “were not a gratuitous personal attack” but rather part of an overall 
political debate in light of the surrounding circumstances of the case.131 
Even if some of Malisiewicz-Gąsior’s statements about Kern contained 
harsh assertions, the Court reiterated the well-established concept that 
well-known politicians must expect and tolerate higher levels of 
“acceptable criticism” as opposed to private individuals.132 
  
 128. Id. at 571. This was the sentence rendered by the Polish appellate court; the 
trial court initially sentenced the defendant to eighteen months in prison suspended for 
five years. Id. The Polish appellate court also ordered the defendant to pay various fines 
for the costs of the appellate proceedings and a fee to the State Treasury. Id. 
 129. See id. at 578; see also Oberschlick v. Austria (No. 2), App. No. 20834/92, 25 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 357, 366 (1997) (holding “[i]nsults, denigrations and offensive language 
could not enjoy general, unlimited protection under the Convention” because they do not 
provide a positive contribution to society’s political development, and they “poison the 
[political] climate by prompting a desire for retaliation”). 
 130. Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 578. Intergovernmental organizations 
and international human rights bodies have noted that criminal defamation laws “involve 
the exercise of state power and the use of state resources,” which in turn renders these 
laws a potential legal tool “to silence opponents and critics.” SCOTT GRIFFEN, 
DEFAMATION AND INSULT LAWS IN THE OSCE REGION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 
(Barbara Trionfi ed., 2017), http://www.osce.org/fom/303181?download=true. 
 131. Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 578; see also Lewandowska-Malec v. 
Poland (No. 2), App. No. 39660/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 61, 64–65 (2012) (holding that the 
criminal defendant’s “impugned assertion [against a political figure] was underpinned by 
a sufficient factual basis” and “part of a political debate” when taken in “the overall 
context in which the applicant made her statement”). 
 132. Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 578; see also Lingens v. Austria, 
App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, 419 (1986) (affirming the acceptable level of 
criticism politicians must be expected to tolerate as opposed to private individuals). The 
Court also noted the crucial importance of free political debate in the context of 
democratic elections, thereby establishing that Malisiewicz-Gąsior’s statements had “a 
socially justified interest” in that Kern should have expected to tolerate a greater degree 
of public criticism. Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 578–79. 
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The European Court of Human Rights also discussed the severity and 
proportionality of the punishment rendered against Malisiewicz-Gąsior at 
the national court level.133 The Court held that although the Polish 
Government indicated that Malisiewicz-Gąsior “did not suffer any 
prejudice” because the prison sentence was not enforced, “what 
matter[ed] here [was] not that her sentence was not enforced but that she 
was convicted at all.”134 In the spirit of the Court’s previous landmark 
holding in Cumpănă v. Romania—where the Court expressly held that 
sentencing upon a criminal conviction was a matter left to the national 
courts’ discretion135—it concluded that the Polish Government’s decision 
to not enforce the prison sentence “[did] not expunge her conviction and 
[did] not quash [Malisiewicz-Gąsior]’s criminal record.”136 In the context 
of a heated political debate, the Court held there was “no justification for 
the imposition of a prison sentence” because a conviction based on 
Malisiewicz-Gąsior’s allegations of abuse of power by an elected official 
while she campaigned for political office herself would create a chilling 
effect on freedom of expression.137 Even suspended prison sentences for 
defamation convictions, which convey the notion that a defendant will 
not serve prison time if he does not commit another defamation offense 
within a specific time frame, will have an inevitable chilling effect with 
respect to public discourse.138 Thus, the mere threat of an enforceable 
  
 133. See Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 579. 
 134. Id. (emphasis added); see also Lopes Gomes Da Silva v. Portugal, App. No. 
37698/97, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1376, 1386 (2000) (finding that there was a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention, and “[t]he journalist’s conviction [even if it was a minor 
penalty] was not therefore a measure that was reasonably proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued bearing in mind the interest of the democratic society in ensuring and 
protecting the freedom of the press”). 
 135. Cumpănă v. Romania, App. No. 33348/96, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 200, 225 (2004). 
In this landmark case involving criminal defamation, the Court ruled that sentencing is a 
matter of the national courts, but prison sentences must “be compatible with journalists’ 
freedom of expression” that is guaranteed by Article 10; the Court allows this 
fundamental right to be seriously impaired under exceptional circumstances, such as 
“hate speech or incitement to violence.” Id. 
 136. Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 579. 
 137. Id.; see also supra Part III.A. 
 138. See MCGONAGLE, supra note 114, at 59; see generally Marchenko v. 
Ukraine, App. No. 4063/04, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. 864, 873 (2009) (holding there was a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention because Marchenko’s “lengthy suspended 
prison sentence” amounted to a substantial interference with his freedom of expression). 
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prison sentence against Malisiewicz-Gąsior at the Polish national court 
level, according to the European Court of Human Rights, “overstepped 
the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to [M]ember States” and 
“failed to strike a fair balance between” protecting a politician’s rights 
and reputation and Malisiewicz-Gąsior’s freedom of expression that is 
“necessary in a democratic society.”139 
IV. PROPOSED LEGAL MECHANISMS TO IMPROVE POLISH COMPLIANCE 
WITH ARTICLE 10 
Because criminal defamation and insult laws in Poland tend to 
produce a chilling effect that potentially foster self-censorship140 among 
journalists, the country’s defamation laws should be reconsidered in 
order to strike the proper balance between an individual’s freedom of 
expression (per Article 10 of the Convention), the media’s ability to 
report on matters of public interest freely without undue governmental 
interference, and protecting an individual’s reputation.141 This section 
examines the various legal proposals already utilized in foreign 
jurisdictions: (1) judicial refusal to enforce criminal liability for 
defamation and insult;142 (2) decriminalizing defamation via legislative 
action;143 and (3) the similar but divergent civil remedies employed in the 
United States and United Kingdom.144 After an examination of these 
jurisdictions’ respective approaches to defamation law, the following 
section will evaluate which system would be the most effective if 
implemented in Poland.145 
  
 139. Malisiewicz-Gąsior, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 579. 
 140. Self-censorship occurs “when journalists purposely avoid newsworthy stories 
as they anticipate negative reactions from their superiors, based on built-in penalties and 
rewards for doing what is expected.” Herdis Thorgeirsdottir, Self-Censorship Among 
Journalists: A (Moral) Wrong or a Violation of ECHR Law?, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
383, 384 (2004). 
 141. GRIFFEN, supra note 27, at 6. 
 142. See infra Part IV.A. 
 143. See infra Part IV.B. 
 144. See infra Part IV.C. 
 145. See infra Part V. 
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A. Judicial Refusal to Enforce Criminal Liability for Defamation 
and Public Insult 
Generally, defamation law throughout continental Europe146 is treated 
as a criminal matter rather than a civil matter.147 Some European 
countries, such as Germany and France, have criminal defamation and 
insult provisions officially recorded within their respective criminal 
codes; however, these countries do not regularly enforce these laws and 
narrowly construe them in favor of the criminal defendant.148 The 
German Criminal Code divides criminal defamation into three 
categories—insult, slander, and malicious defamation.149 This criminal 
code expressly bars insulting the German Republic, the flag, the colors of 
the Republic, public order, and foreign heads of state150 and defaming the 
German president, government, constitutional court, and legislature.151 
The penalties in Germany, similar to the penalties in Poland for identical 
crimes,152 carry potential prison sentences153 as a result of individuals 
freely expressing their thoughts and opinions.154 However, these 
provisions within the German criminal code are thought to be of minimal 
  
 146. The United Kingdom detracts from continental Europe in this sense because 
criminal proceedings are bypassed in favor of civil litigation; the plaintiff, in seeking civil 
redress (i.e., damages), files a civil complaint, in which the plaintiff claims the defendant 
defamed him. See infra Part IV.C.ii. 
 147. Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 871. Only five European Union Member 
States (Cyprus, Estonia, Ireland, Romania, and the United Kingdom) repealed criminal 
defamation as an offense against private individuals. GRIFFEN, supra note 27, at 10. All 
other Member States, including Poland, have some form of criminal penalty for 
defamation. See id. 
 148. Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 873. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See Germany Will Abolish Law Against Insulting Foreign Heads of State, 
CBS NEWS (Jan. 25, 2017, 12:03 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/germany-will-
abolish-law-against-insulting-foreign-heads-of-state/ (reporting that Germany recently 
abolished an “outdated and unnecessary” law that permitted the prosecution of a person 
who insulted a foreign head of state). 
 151. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], §§ 90–90(b), translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.pdf (Ger.). 
 152. See KODEKS KARNY [KK] [THE PENAL CODE] art. 212, §§ 1–2 (Pol.) (criminal 
defamation); KODEKS KARNY [KK] [THE PENAL CODE] art. 216, §§ 1–2 (Pol.) (public 
insult). 
 153. See STRAFGESETZBUCH, §§ 90–90(b). 
 154. See GRIFFEN, supra note 27, at 6. 
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importance because Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court has held in 
favor of freedom of expression and severely weakened an individual’s 
ability to initiate a defamation or insult case that carry criminal 
implications.155 Today, there are limited “classic insults”—such as 
calling someone an old Nazi,156 a pig, or a fascist—that result in a 
plaintiff and defendant appearing before a German court.157 
Countries such as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
follow Germany’s lead and rarely invoke their respective criminal 
defamation and insult laws against the press.158 The Danish Criminal 
Code states that a person who uses “insults, abusive language or other 
offensive words or gestures [against individuals], while they are 
executing their [public] office or function or on occasion of such office 
or function, shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for [a] term not 
exceeding six months.”159 In light of this facially harsh criminal 
provision, there are no recent court cases that have convicted journalists 
for these offenses.160  
Denmark’s neighbor, Norway, also rarely enforces criminal charges 
for defamation against individuals or the media despite the existence of 
criminal laws within its criminal code.161 Recently, Norway implemented 
amendments to its criminal code, and as of October 2016, defamation has 
been removed as a criminal offense and now limits a plaintiff to recover 
damages via civil litigation.162 Likewise, the Netherlands rarely charges 
  
 155. Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 873. 
 156. Germany’s Basic Law contains provisions protecting freedom of expression, 
but the nation’s horrific past with Nazism has resulted in statutory restrictions on 
communications insinuating criminal agitation and representations of violence and racial 
hatred insofar that the restrictions honor free expression but are also designed to “combat 
the resurgence of Nazism.” See David E. Weiss, Striking a Difficult Balance: Combatting 
the Threat of Neo-Nazism in Germany While Preserving Individual Liberties, 27 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 899, 917, 919, 924–26 (1994). 
 157. Erik Kirschbaum, In Germany, It Can be a Crime to Insult Someone in 
Public, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016, 6:35 AM), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-
fg-germany-insult-law-snap-story.html. There must also be at least one witness or “some 
record” to indicate that the disparaging remarks were made by the defendant. Id. 
 158. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 874. 
 159. STRAFFELOVEN [PENAL CODE], § 121 (Den.). 
 160. Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 874. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Norway, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2016/norway (last visited Jan. 7, 2017). 
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journalists with criminal defamation, and “Sweden has completely 
repealed its criminal laws prohibiting insult of government officials and 
national symbols.”163 Lastly, it is noteworthy that Freedom House lists 
these aforementioned countries, Norway in particular, as “the world’s 
most open media environments”164 and allocates these countries high 
scores with respect to press freedoms.165 
B. Amend the Polish Penal Code to Decriminalize Defamation 
and Public Insult 
Another alternative to criminal defamation and insult laws is to 
abolish criminal liability and limit a plaintiff to civil litigation in a 
defamation action because monetary damages are a “proportionate 
response for [any] illegitimate harm done to reputation.”166 Unlike 
criminal sanctions, which encompass imprisonment, fines, probation, or 
the threat thereof and a stigma that is “burdensome and sometimes 
destructive” for the individual, civil remedies involve a court order 
allowing the plaintiff to return to the status quo ante.167 Thus, in addition 
to negating a criminal conviction from the defendant’s record, civil 
recourse seeks “to make the injured party whole” again by compensating 
the plaintiff for damage caused.168 For example, Ireland has statutorily 
abrogated criminal defamation offenses under the enactment of the 
country’s 2009 Defamation Act and implemented a legal regime that 
imposes civil liability on defendants in defamation cases.169 
  
 163. Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 874–75. 
 164. Norway, supra note 162. 
 165. See Freedom of the Press: 2016, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016 (last visited Jan. 7, 
2017). Applicants also infrequently lodge complaints against these countries to the 
European Court of Human Rights, with Norway receiving five complaints, Sweden 
receiving two complaints, and the Netherlands receiving seven complaints. Violations by 
Article and Respondent State 1959–2015, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2015_ENG.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2017). 
 166. GRIFFEN, supra note 27, at 7. 
 167. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between 
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1809 (1992). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See Ireland, INT’L PRESS INST., http://legaldb.freemedia.at/legal-
database/ireland/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2017). 
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Under Part 5 of the 2009 Irish Defamation Act, the national 
legislature abolished criminal liability for “[t]he common law offences of 
defamatory libel, seditious libel and obscene libel . . . .”170 Part 2 of the 
Irish Defamation Act maintains the same elements as criminal 
defamation, except the primary distinction is the civil redress as opposed 
to criminal sanctions rendered against the defendant.171 The statute states 
that “defamation consists of the publication, by any means, of a 
defamatory statement” with respect to one or more people, and the 
plaintiff alleging defamation could reasonably understand the defamatory 
statement refers to him.172 In repealing criminal liability for defamation, 
Ireland introduced a defense to a defamation allegation for distinguishing 
between allegations of fact and opinion.173 To establish this defense, the 
following must be proven: (1) “the extent to which the statement is 
capable of being proved”; (2) the statement under the circumstances 
could have been “reasonably understood” to be an opinion rather than an 
allegation of fact; and (3) the statement was used to the extent that a 
disclaimer was accompanied by “cautionary words.”174 
Section 31 of the 2009 Irish Defamation Act provides for civil redress 
in a successful defamation case via general damages and special 
damages,175 and Section 32 permits under judicial discretion the option of 
punitive damages “payable by the defendant to the plaintiff” if punitive 
damages are appropriate to fully compensate the plaintiff for reputational 
injury.176 In applying this statute, the Irish High Court recently awarded 
well-known businessman Denis O’Brien €150,000 in a defamation 
  
 170. Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) § 35 (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2009/act/31/enacted/en/pdf. Part 2 of the statute also 
indicates that the torts of libel and slander shall be collectively referred to as the “tort of 
defamation.” Id. § 6(1)(b). 
 171. See id. § 6(2)–(5). 
 172. Id. § 6(2)–(3). 
 173. See id. § 21. 
 174. Id. § 21(a)–(c). Additionally, the statute extended the defenses for truth, 
absolute privilege, qualified privilege, honest opinion, offer to make amends, apology, 
consent to publish, fair and reasonable publication on a matter of public interest, and 
innocent publication. Id. §§ 16–18, 20, 22, 24–27. 
 175. Id. § 31(3), (7). 
 176. Id. § 32(2). 
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lawsuit against the Daily Mail, a newspaper outlet.177 A jury concluded 
the published article implied that O’Brien was assisting in relief 
following the devastating earthquake in Haiti out of hypocritical self-
interest and that his relief effort was an “ingenious feint.”178 
In Ireland, the country’s prime minister or other high-ranking public 
officials may also file defamation lawsuits against third parties if his 
reputation is harmed by a publication that was directed toward him.179 
However, proving damage to reputation is potentially challenging to 
uphold in court because publishers are likely to defend themselves by 
pleading the common law defense of “fair comment,”180 which denotes 
“the subject matter of the comment is of such interest to the public that 
he should be free to make it without paying for the harm he does by 
defaming the plaintiff.”181 For example, publishing a cartoon illustrating 
the prime minister as a pig is facially defamatory and “subjects the Prime 
Minister to ridicule and contempt,” but a publisher could plead the fair 
comment defense and indicate that the cartoon is meant to be satirical.182 
Overall, the Irish approach to defamation cases appears to be a workable 
and effective legal mechanism, which is demonstrated by the fact that 
only one citizen lodged a complaint against Ireland with the European 
  
 177. See Tim Healy, Denis O’Brien Wins €150,000 in Daily Mail Defamation 
Case, INDEP. (Feb. 14, 2013, 8:55 PM), http://www.independent.ie/irish-
news/courts/denis-obrien-wins-150000-in-daily-mail-defamation-case-
29070377.html#sthash.j0BEpp6m.dpuf. Following the jury verdict, O’Brien commented 
that he felt “vindicated” with the judgment because “everybody should have a right to 
their good name.” Id. 
 178. Id. Notably, the Irish High Court did not award O’Brien “aggravated 
damages,” or punitive damages. See id. 
 179. GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, AURELIA COLOMBI CIACCHI & PATRICK O’CALLAGHAN, 
PERSONALITY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW 264 (2010). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1949). 
 182. BRÜGGEMEIER, CIACCHI & O’CALLAGHAN, supra note 179, at 264; but see 
Edward J. Eberle, Public Discourse in Contemporary Germany, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
797, 862 (1997) Professor Eberle discusses the Strauss caricature and political satire case 
in Germany, where Strauss—a Bavarian public official—was depicted as a “sexually 
active pig.” Id. The Constitutional Court found this satire to exceed “the bounds of 
propriety” because “[t]he crude depiction could only be viewed as a sharp, scurrilous 
attack on Strauss.” Id. By depicting Strauss as an animal engaging in a sexual act, the 
Court held Strauss’s dignity had been intruded upon and violated. Id. In contrast to 
Ireland, Germany, in exceptional cases, prioritizes “human dignity and personality rights” 
over an individual’s “speaker rights.” Id. 
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Court of Human Rights from 1959–2015 with respect to violating an 
individual’s freedom of expression.183 
C. The American and British Approaches to Defamation 
i. The American Approach 
American First Amendment jurisprudence with respect to freedom of 
expression is based on the “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”184 In general, defamation in the United States is redressed 
under tort liability, which is under the umbrella of civil liability and 
thereby constitutes a public wrong.185 When considering the potential for 
criminal penalties for defamation, an American federal appeals court 
once held “there remains little constitutional vitality to criminal libel 
laws” and that “[w]e would serve little purpose by discussing the 
ignominious history of the law surrounding criminal libel.”186 
  
 183. Violations by Article and Respondent State 1959–2015, supra note 165. 
 184. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). In the United 
States, pursuant to federal and state constitutional guarantees prescribing free expression, 
state law governs defamation actions, resulting in 50 similar—but independent—
defamation regimes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3919 (West 2018); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 17B:30-7 (West 2018); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8344 (West 2018). Some 
jurisdictions in the United States have statutes or constitutional provisions that govern the 
prosecution of criminal libel, even though the state courts rarely enforce the laws. See, 
e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 6; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.370 (West 2018); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15-168 (West 2018). 
 185. Lisby, supra note 60, at 435; see also VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY 
& DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
879–80 (13th ed. 2015) (discussing a brief history of defamation law through the 
common law and defamation’s inclusion in tort law). Historically, criminal defamation 
and public insult has previously surfaced onto the American legal landscape following 
the colonial experience and independence from Great Britain. Lisby, supra note 60, at 
458. The Sedition Act of 1798, which Congress enacted in early American history, 
punished expression that was “contemptuous of the president, the government or 
Congress.” Id. 
 186. Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 (8th Cir. 1973). Moreover, 
some American jurisdictions have “never adopted general criminal libel legislation” and 
instead have opted to empower claimants by allowing them to avail themselves in the 
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Although there is “[s]cant, if any evidence . . . that the First 
Amendment was intended to abolish” criminal liability for defamation 
allegations,187 the United States Supreme Court’s landmark holding in 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan controls the overarching defamation 
jurisprudence in all American courts.188 The applicable standard set forth 
in New York Times Co. requires that in order to recover civil damages for 
defamation, public officials must prove that false statements made 
against them were communicated with “actual malice” or “reckless 
disregard”189 on the part of the alleged defamer.190 This high threshold of 
actual malice is required to prove defamation because “[i]t is of the 
utmost consequence that [citizens openly] discuss the character and 
qualifications” of public officials and figures, and injury to their 
reputation “yield[s] to the public welfare, although at times such injury 
may be great.”191 Citizens should be awarded “breathing space”192 in the 
arena of free public debate with respect to elected officials and 
“[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free 
debate.”193 An individual’s constitutional right to freedom of expression 
  
civil arena when an alleged defamatory publication “may be a crime as well as an 
actionable civil wrong.” State v. Browne, 206 A.2d 591, 596–97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1965). 
 187. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 381 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). 
 188. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 283 (holding that the United States 
Constitution “delimits” the amount a public official may recover in a libel action for 
criticisms directed at their “official conduct”). 
 189. “Actual malice” is defined as knowledge that the statement was false, and 
“reckless disregard” implies that the speaker of the statement was reckless in determining 
the truthfulness or falsity of the statement. Id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The 
Court declared, “Good motives and belief in truth do not negate an inference of malice, 
but are relevant only in mitigation of punitive damages if the jury chooses to accord them 
weight.” Id. at 267 (majority opinion). 
 190. Id. at 279–80; see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (implementing different legal 
standards that divide public officials and public figures from private individuals in 
defamation cases because of private individuals’ level of vulnerability to reputational 
injury and access to counteracting false statements made by third parties). 
 191. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 281 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 
281, 286 (Kan. 1908)). 
 192. Id. at 272 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 193. Id. (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)). The 
Supreme Court stated that injuring an official’s reputation does not inevitably permit 
restricting an individual’s freedom of speech, and repression is only justified when there 
is “a clear and present danger of the obstruction of justice.” Id. at 272–73. 
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will not be repressed merely because “effective criticism” of a public 
official “diminishes [his] official reputation[].”194 Moreover, defamatory 
statements require that the plaintiff prove that the statements were made 
“of and concerning” him; otherwise, the plaintiff’s claim for defamation 
will fail.195 Furthermore, arguably in dictum, the United States Supreme 
Court reasoned that civil liability should govern defamation cases 
because “no court of last resort in this country has ever held, or even 
suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government have any place in 
the American system of jurisprudence.”196 
Likewise, American jurisprudence goes beyond its European 
counterparts with respect to protecting one’s reputation, particularly a 
public figure, when counterbalancing an individual’s freedom of 
expression.197 To succeed in a defamation case based on harming a public 
figure’s reputation in the United States, the standard to satisfy is high, as 
set forth in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.198 In this defamation case, 
the Supreme Court held that a public figure is barred from recovering 
damages regarding publications that potentially harm his reputation, but 
were “not reasonably believable.”199 In accord with the First 
  
 194. Id. at 273. 
 195. Id. at 288. 
 196. Id. at 291 (quoting City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 139 N.E. 86, 88 (Ill. 
1923)). “The present proposition would sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criticism of 
government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism, and 
hence potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed.” Id. 
 197. See Tóth, supra note 83, at 487 (recognizing that “Member States of the 
European Union and Switzerland—where acts against honour and human dignity are 
looked upon rather harshly—are given special consideration”). Case law deriving from 
the United States Supreme Court has undeniably had an impact on the European Court of 
Human Rights’s freedom of speech and press jurisprudence. See Thorgeirsdottir, supra 
note 140, at 393–94. 
 198. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding public 
figures and public officials are barred from recovering damages via intentional infliction 
of emotional distress “by reason of publications . . . without showing in addition that the 
publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice,’ [or] 
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it 
was true”). 
 199. Id. at 57 (quoting Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1278 (4th Cir. 1986)). 
Notably, the Court also held that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress (IIED) for a defaming publication unless he or she makes a showing 
that the false statement was made with “actual malice,” which indicates that the 
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Amendment, the Falwell standard constitutionally protects “slashing and 
one-sided” caricatures that may not be “reasoned or evenhanded” even 
when the “exploitation of unfortunate physical traits or politically 
embarrassing events” is meant to “injure [the plaintiff’s] feelings” and 
consequently adversely impact the plaintiff’s reputation.200 
ii. The British Approach 
British defamation law follows a similar approach to American 
defamation law because cases involving defamation are well settled 
under civil law as opposed to criminal law.201 The common law offenses 
of seditious libel, defamatory libel, and obscene libel in England, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland were abolished following the enactment of the 
Coroners and Justice Act in 2009.202 Prior to abolishing defamation as a 
crime in 2009, the criminal statutes were essentially unused and not 
enforced by British courts.203 However, the United Kingdom, more 
specifically its capital city of London, was previously known as “the libel 
capital of the world” because British defamation law “substantively 
favor[ed] [and continues to favor] plaintiffs.”204 In the past, British courts 
also tended to exercise expansive jurisdiction over defendants, including 
defendants in other countries.205 Legal costs were borne by defendants, 
meaning plaintiffs could file suit in some instances merely because they 
  
defendant had knowledge that the statement was false. Id. at 56. Thus, a jury may only 
award damages for an IIED claim if the defendant’s conduct was “outrageous.” Id. at 57. 
 200. Id. at 54; see also Cohen Peart, Cartoons of the Day: First Presidential 
Debate Between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, DENV. POST (Sept. 28, 2016, 1:18 
PM), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/28/cartoons-of-the-day-first-presidential-
debate-between-clinton-and-trump/ (depicting caricatures of presidential candidates 
Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton that are constitutionally protected under the Falwell 
standard). 
 201. See generally Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 12(1) (Eng.) (utilizing the term 
“claimant,” which denotes a civil action). 
 202. Coroners and Justice Act 2009, c. 25, § 73 (Eng.). Under the common law, 
defamation crimes were designed to deter insulting or abusive speech, while protecting 
and maintaining public order. See Lord Lester, supra note 98, at 131. 
 203. Tóth, supra note 83, at 488. 
 204. Stephen Bates, Libel Capital No More? Reforming British Defamation Law, 
34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 233, 233–34 (2012). 
 205. Id. at 234. 
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would not expend vast financial resources even if they did not succeed in 
court.206 
Under British law, plaintiffs in a civil defamation lawsuit do not need 
to prove reputational harm in order to recover damages because the law 
establishes an “irrebuttable presumption . . . that the publication of a 
defamatory article causes damage to the reputation of the person 
defamed.”207 Also, unlike jurisdictions such as the United States and 
those across continental Europe, British courts utilize a uniform standard 
for public officials, public figures, and private individuals.208 Due to the 
prior extensive application of British defamation law and the so-called 
“libel tourism,” the American Congress enacted legislation that barred 
English libel judgments from having legal effect and therefore prevented 
the judgments from being enforced against defendants residing in the 
United States.209 
Until statutory reform in 2013,210 British defamation law balanced 
freedom of expression and protection of reputation with respect to media 
dissemination under the standard set forth in Reynolds v. Times 
Newspapers Limited and Others.211 In that case, Reynolds was the Prime 
Minister of Ireland until a political crisis commenced in 1994.212 As a 
result of the crisis, Reynolds resigned from his position, and reasons for 
  
 206. Id. Estimates have shown that roughly 90 percent of plaintiffs in British 
defamation cases are successful in their lawsuits. Id. The British courts’ expansive 
jurisdiction over defendants was termed “libel tourism” because it incentivized plaintiffs 
to file suit against defendants even if the defendants’ statements had “minimal effect in 
Britain.” Id. 
 207. Id. at 247 (quoting Mardas v. New York Times Co. [2008] EWHC (QB) 3135 
[12] (Eng.)). Relating back to an earlier discussion, the Mardas Court extended 
jurisdiction to the defendant even though there was a wider circulation of the publication 
in the United States and France, and the United Kingdom claimed to only have a “smaller 
local publication.” Mardas v. New York Times Co. [2008] EWHC (QB) 3135 [39] 
(Eng.). 
 208. Bates, supra note 204, at 248. 
 209. Lord Lester, supra note 98, at 136; see generally Securing the Protection of 
our Enduring & Established Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 
4101–4105 (2010) (barring both federal and state courts from enforcing defamation 
judgments rendered by foreign jurisdictions that champion “libel tourism”). 
 210. See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4(6) (Eng.) (abolishing the Reynolds 
defense). 
 211. See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1999] UKHL 45 (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
 212. Id. 
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his resignation “were of public significance and interest in the United 
Kingdom” because of Reynolds’s association with Northern Ireland’s 
peace process.213 Following his resignation, the Sunday Times published 
an article in its British mainland edition entitled “Goodbye [G]ombeen 
[M]an.”214 However, on the same day, the Irish edition of the Sunday 
Times published an article entitled “House of Cards” about the fall of the 
prior government.215 The Irish edition contained obvious differences 
when compared to the British mainland edition, and Reynolds alleged 
that the British mainland article was defamatory because it articulated 
that Reynolds “had deliberately and dishonestly misled” the Irish House 
of Representatives.216 The House of Lords held that although the media 
was required to act in good faith and report factually, it was not required 
to guarantee factual accuracy.217 The information with the article was 
“undoubtedly of public concern” in the United Kingdom, and “[i]t goes 
without saying that a journalist is entitled and bound to reach his own 
conclusions and to express them honestly and fearlessly.”218 
Moreover, the Reynolds defense was statutorily abolished in 2013 
following the United Kingdom’s defamation law reform.219 Similarly, 
under the 2013 Defamation Act, defendants are permitted to show that 
the alleged defamatory statement was made “on a matter of public 
interest” along with the defendant reasonably believing the statement 
was made in the public interest.220 This defamation law reform also 
  
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. The article also featured a subtitle entitled “Why a fib too far proved fatal 
for the political career of Ireland’s peacemaker and Mr. Fixit.” Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. However, the House of Lords affirmed the ruling rendered by the Court of 
Appeal because the serious allegations made by the Sunday Times “were not information 
the public had a right to know,” and a public interest privilege was no applicable. Id. The 
Reynolds defense was later reaffirmed. See generally Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe 
[2006] UKHL 44 [29] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 219. See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4(6) (Eng.). 
 220. Id. § 4(1)(a)–(b). The 2013 Defamation Act’s public interest and reasonable 
belief defense replaces the Reynolds defense, which took a wide array of circumstances 
into account. See Reynolds, [1999] UKHL 45 (outlining Lord Nicholls’s non-exhaustive 
list of circumstances that must be taken into account, including the allegation’s 
seriousness, the article’s tone, the steps taken to verify information, the extent to which 
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limited the phenomenon of libel tourism by severely curbing British 
jurisdiction over defamation defendants.221 
V. EVALUATING THE PROPOSALS 
A. Judicial Refusal to Enforce Criminal Liability for Defamation 
and Public Insult 
The seemingly obvious alternative option for Poland with respect to 
amending its criminal defamation and insult laws is to mimic its 
continental European counterparts and decline to enforce criminal 
liability for defamation actions.222 The German Federal Constitutional 
Court ruled that insults against state symbols must typically be tolerated 
regardless of the harshness of the insults223 because of the importance of 
one’s constitutional right to freedom of speech.224 Nonetheless, some 
exceptions to this general rule continue to theoretically apply if an 
individual insults a police officer or calls another individual an “old 
Nazi.”225 Thus, the nation’s highest court must generally rule in favor of 
freedom of speech over the specific underlying national criminal code 
provisions by choosing not to habitually enforce them.226 In contrast, the 
Polish Constitutional Court has recently defended the enforcement of 
both criminal defamation227 and public insult laws, holding that the laws 
are consistent with the Polish Constitution.228 In 2011, the Polish 
  
the subject matter is of public concern, and the seriousness of the allegation made by the 
media). 
 221. See Defamation Act 2013 §§ 9–10 (Eng.). 
 222. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 871. 
 223. In considering the significance of the German flag, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court has ruled that “[t]he flag serves as an important integration device . . 
. [and] its disparagement can thus impair the necessary authority of the state. From this, . 
. . state symbols only enjoy constitutional protection in so far as they represent what 
fundamentally characterizes the Federal Republic.” Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 
[Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 7, 1990, 81 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 278 (Ger.). 
 224. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 873. 
 225. Kirschbaum, supra note 157. 
 226. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 873. 
 227. See Polish Rights Ombudsman Criticises Criminal Defamation, supra note 7. 
 228. See Press Release, Criminal Liability for the Public Insult of the President, 
supra note 52. 
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Constitutional Court upheld the country’s public insult laws, specifically 
insults against the president, in light of Section 1 of Article 54 of the 
Polish Constitution, which allows the freedom to express opinions and 
acquire and disseminate information.229 The Polish Constitutional Court 
denoted the president’s various functions and duties as “the guarantor of 
the continuity of State authority” and any insult directed toward the 
president of the Republic would undoubtedly disturb public order, while 
potentially weakening the president’s position internationally and among 
world leaders.230 The Polish High Court noted that the provision facially 
interferes with an individual’s freedom of expression enumerated in 
Section 1 of Article 54 of the Polish Constitution, but insults may not be 
defended as preventing a criticism because they lack legitimacy within 
the context of public debate and are not protected under the Polish 
Constitution or even Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.231 
Similarly, the Polish Constitutional Court in 2006 held that the 
country’s criminal defamation laws were consistent with the Polish 
Constitution and freedom of expression.232 In reviewing relevant 
domestic law, the European Court of Human Rights stated that the Polish 
Constitutional Court held that protecting rights and freedoms such as 
“dignity, good name and privacy might prevail over” protecting an 
individual’s freedom of expression.233 Additionally, the Polish 
Constitutional Court found that protecting personal reputational rights 
could not presumably provide the equally effective relief that is found in 
  
 229. Constitutional Tribunal Advisory Opinion, supra note 51, ¶¶ 3, 3.4. The 
Court rendered a decision on the provision’s constitutionality even after the public 
prosecutor discontinued investigating a case involving a public insult made against then-
President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, when the case was still on appeal. Id. ¶ 1.1. 
 230. Id. ¶ 4.1. The Court pointed to these reasons as “legitimate aims” as set forth 
in Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Id. ¶ 5. 
 231. See id. ¶ 4.3. The Polish Constitutional Court went further to assert that “the 
penalisation of a public insult to the President of the Republic of Poland does not hinder 
possible criticism of the activity of the said authority and the course of public debate.” Id. 
The Court furthered its assertion by indicating, “[i]n a democratic state[,] … debate may 
held in civilised and well-mannered way, without any detriment to the rights and 
freedoms of persons and citizens as well as to the proper functioning of public 
institutions.” Id. 
 232. See Gąsior v. Poland, App. No. 34472/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 22 (2012). 
 233. Id. 
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criminal law.234 Therefore, according to the Polish Constitutional Court, 
protecting an individual’s reputation by the use of criminal law did not 
violate the freedoms enumerated within the Polish Constitution.235 
Polish courts are unlikely to follow the current legal standards applied 
in countries such as Germany, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, or 
Sweden by not habitually enforcing criminal liability for defamation or 
public insult.236 The German Federal Constitutional Court previously 
weakened the enforceability of criminal liability for defamation,237 
whereas the Polish High Court has consistently upheld criminal liability 
for analogous laws even when it concurrently reaffirmed the idea that the 
purpose of freedom of expression is “to provide the individual with a 
possibility of self-fulfilment in the personal realm” while securing 
individual development in a democratic state.238 This legal proposal is 
not an effective approach to reforming Polish defamation law because 
Polish courts are either reluctant to refuse enforcement of criminal 
defamation laws or, more ordinarily, continue to apply criminal liability 
to those found guilty.239 For example, in 2013, under Section 2 of Article 
212 of the Polish Penal Code with respect to defamation against the 
media, Polish courts criminally convicted 11 individuals and 2 
convictions resulted in suspended prison sentences.240 Also in 2013, for 
insulting a public official under Section 1 of Article 226 of the Polish 
Penal Code, there were 3,666 criminal convictions, with 220 resulting in 
unconditional prison sentences and 1,261 suspended prison sentences.241  
Thus, it does not appear that Polish courts are demonstrating a pattern 
of following their European counterparts by refusing to enforce criminal 
defamation laws but are instead choosing to protect individuals’—
typically governmental officials—personal reputations at the expense of 
  
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. 
 236. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 873–74. 
 237. See id. at 873. 
 238. Constitutional Tribunal Advisory Opinion, supra note 51, ¶ 3. 
 239. See Poland, INT’L PRESS INST., http://legaldb.freemedia.at/legal-
database/poland/?target=criminal-defamation (last visited Jan. 12, 2017). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. In 2013, however, there were no convictions for insulting the President of 
Poland under Article 135, Section 2, but there was one unconditional prison sentence 
following a conviction for an insult of a constitutional authority under Article 226, 
Section 3, of the Polish Penal Code. Id. 
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freedom of expression.242 Without some enforcement mechanism243 
preventing national courts from applying criminal liability for 
defamation and insult, Poland will continue the overall trend that exists 
in Europe by maintaining its current defamation and insult laws.244 In 
addition, the United States Supreme Court once observed that overruling 
prior established and even controversial precedent “overtax[es] the 
country’s belief in the Court’s good faith” and such a decision would 
allude to the idea that the Court erroneously decided the prior case, 
thereby negatively impacting and undermining the Court’s legitimacy.245 
B. Amend the Polish Penal Code to Decriminalize Defamation 
and Public Insult 
The ideal legal mechanism to supplant criminal liability in Poland for 
defamation actions is to follow the Irish example by amending the 
current Polish Penal Code.246 Contemporary Irish law only authorizes 
civil redress for any injury incurred from a defamatory publication and 
awards the appropriate monetary damages to place the plaintiff in the 
position he or she was in prior to the initiated litigation.247 By imposing 
only civil penalties and abolishing criminal liability in defamation 
actions in Poland, the potential for self-censorship and the chilling effect 
  
 242. Constitutional Tribunal Advisory Opinion, supra note 51, ¶ 5 (upholding the 
constitutionality of public insult and affirming its consistency with Article 10 of the 
Convention). 
 243. The Sejm and Senate would have to amend the penal code and abolish 
criminal liability for defamation actions pursuant to the legislative powers granted to 
them in the Polish Constitution. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND, art. 
95, § 1 (Pol.). 
 244. See GRIFFEN, supra note 27, at 10 (“Despite an overall trend toward the 
abolition of criminal defamation laws, to say such laws are alive and well in the European 
Union would be putting it mildly.”). 
 245. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992). The United States 
Supreme Court contended that “[t]here is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly 
be imputed to prior Courts . . . [and] [t]he legitimacy of the Court would fade with the 
frequency of its vacillation.” Id.  
 246. See generally Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) § 35 (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2009/act/31/enacted/en/pdf (abolishing criminal 
liability for defamation proceedings). 
 247. See id. § 31(4)(a)–(k) (allowing the defendant to recover on the basis of the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the case). 
616 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 26.3 
on public debate and matters of public interest will likely decline along 
with the “substantial undesirable effects on freedom of expression and 
information” that are associated with criminal sanctions.248 Additionally, 
the elimination of criminal penalties in favor of civil relief would 
eradicate the possibility of a defendant amassing a criminal record, 
which has the potential to be detrimental to a defendant’s personal and 
professional reputation and ambitions.249 
Furthermore, implementing an Irish defamation scheme in Poland 
would reduce self-censorship because Irish defamation law is designed to 
make the plaintiff satisfy a high statutory threshold in ascertaining harm 
to his reputation.250 Instead of placing the right of reputation ahead of 
freedom of expression, Poland would adopt a defamation regime that 
allows for a freer flow of information and heightened public debate on 
legitimate matters of public interest.251 This system of civil recourse 
would further the goals and objectives of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, which both accentuate the right to freedom of expression through 
“hold[ing] opinions and . . . receiv[ing] and impart[ing] information” 
without governmental interference “regardless of frontiers.”252 
Critics advocate the idea that civil penalties may continue to place a 
chilling effect on defendants and the freedom of expression.253 With the 
  
 248. Decriminalisation of Defamation, supra note 50; see also MCGONAGLE, 
supra note 114, at 24. 
 249. See MCGONAGLE, supra note 114, at 56. 
 250. See BRÜGGEMEIER, CIACCHI & O’CALLAGHAN, supra note 179, at 264. 
 251. Compare id. (showing that even if the Irish Prime Minister in a defamation 
action can prove an “ordinary reasonable reader [would] understand [a] cartoon to imply . 
. . [he] had acted in some inappropriate manner,” the publisher will likely be relieved 
from paying damages because the publisher can plead the fair comment defense), with 
Man Convicted of Insulting Polish President, supra note 1, and Blogger Charged with 
Insulting Polish President, supra note 6 (providing two Polish examples that indicate 
ridiculing the President of Poland and other high ranking officials result in criminal 
penalties, even if the material was meant to be “satirical”). 
 252. The Convention, supra note 79, art. 10(1); see also Charter of Rights art. 
11(1). 
 253. See David Boies, The Chilling Effect of Libel Defamation Costs: The 
Problem and Possible Solution, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1207, 1212 (1995). For example, the 
International Press Institute warned that “civil lawsuits launched by public figures or that 
claim disproportionate damage awards remain significant areas of concern,” especially 
following Poland’s ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party’s libel suit against a leading Polish 
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availability of defamation lawsuits, a chilling effect is generated merely 
because of the substantial cost that is associated with defending 
lawsuits.254 Furthermore, a chilling effect comes in the form of the threat 
of a potential lawsuit that may impose an unrecoverable cost if not won 
in court.255 Nonetheless, civil damages may only be awarded on a case-
by-case basis, particularly with respect to “the nature and gravity of any 
allegation in the defamatory statement concerned.”256 Although the costs 
of civil defamation might still engender some form of self-censorship 
due to a chilling effect, these potential side effects substantially outweigh 
the self-censorship that results from a criminal conviction for 
defamation.257 While one may argue that criminal sanctions for 
defamation protect public order and the rights and reputation of the 
individual harmed, these claims can be satisfied equally under available 
civil remedies.258 Freedom of expression is hindered when journalists are 
threatened with criminal penalties simply because an individual’s 
reputational interests are harmed.259 Criminal convictions, as opposed to 
civil judgments, impose a social stigma on the individual convicted of a 
  
newspaper, which published an opinion piece “that criticised Polish President Andrzej 
Duda’s pardon of a former anti-corruption official convicted of abuse of power.” Polish 
Governing Party Files Libel Suit Over Critical Commentary, INT’L PRESS. INST. (Feb. 5, 
2016), https://www.ifex.org/poland/2016/02/05/libel_suit/. The article condemned 
President Duda’s pardon as an “anarchic gesture” that reflected a “mafia state,” in which 
the ruling party was determined to “exert pressure and even intimidate the judiciary.” Id. 
 254. See Boies, supra note 253, at 1212; see also Shane Phelan, Libel Laws Face 
Review as ‘Awards in Ireland Are Wholly Out of Kilter’, INDEPENDENT.IE (Nov. 2, 2016, 
2:30 AM), http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/libel-laws-face-review-as-
awards-in-ireland-are-wholly-out-of-kilter-35181234.html (emphasizing the extreme and 
sometimes excessive costs associated with a defamation lawsuit). 
 255. See Boies, supra note 253, at 1210 (emphasis added). 
 256. Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) § 31(4)(a) (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2009/act/31/enacted/en/pdf. Other factors considered 
include the extent of circulation of the defamatory statement, the importance of the 
plaintiff’s reputation “in the eyes” of those who observed the defamatory statement, and 
“evidence given concerning the reputation of the plaintiff.” Id. § 31(4)(c), (f), (h). 
 257. See Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 893. 
 258. See id. 
 259. See id.; see also Richard N. Winfield, The Wasting Disease and a Cure: 
Freedom of the Press in Emerging Democracies, 20 COMM. L. 22, 24 (2002) (asserting 
that defamation should be “exclusively a civil remedy to reconcile two competing values: 
an individual person’s right to reputation and the right of a free press to publish”). 
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particular crime.260 The defendant in a criminal defamation prosecution 
acquires a criminal record, while the plaintiff receives nothing in return 
other than mere satisfaction—all at the expense of the defendant’s 
freedom of expression.261 Conversely, in a civil action for defamation, 
the plaintiff has a valid monetary remedy and is restored to the status quo 
ante “to the extent that money can do so.”262 
C. The American and British Approaches to Defamation 
i. The American Approach 
While the American judiciary’s First Amendment jurisprudence has 
implemented a “progressive ‘constitutionalization of defamation’” in the 
aftermath of the United States Supreme Court’s seminal holding in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, it is plausible to argue that Poland can 
effectively institute an American-style approach to defamation law.263 
This proposal is achievable even though Europeans have different 
viewpoints regarding the metes and bounds of speech freedoms than 
Americans.264 Polish legislators, however, would likely be required to go 
beyond the overall scope of Article 10 of the Convention because unlike 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, freedom of 
expression is a limited right and can be restricted under some 
circumstances as provided in the Convention, most notably with respect 
to safeguarding an individual’s reputation from undue harm.265 
  
 260. See W. David Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re 
Winship, Stigma, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 139 (2011); 
see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (emphasizing the public stigma that is 
inflicted upon a criminal defendant following a conviction). 
 261. See generally Ball, supra note 260, at 124 (“If a law has a civil label, labels 
are all that matters; after a law is labeled criminal, labels no longer matter.”). 
 262. Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, 91 GEO. L.J. 659, 660 
(2003). 
 263. Régis Bismuth, Standards of Conduct for Journalists Under Europe’s First 
Amendment, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 283, 283–84 (2010). 
 264. Constitutional “Refolution” in the Ex-Communist World: The Rule of Law, 
supra note 35, at 56. Americans are so infused with their First Amendment freedoms that 
they have “more expansive ideas” regarding free speech than Western and Eastern 
Europeans. Id. 
 265. See Bismuth, supra note 263, at 286–87, 293. 
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Historically speaking, American First Amendment jurisprudence has 
not always been as liberal as it was in the United States Supreme Court’s 
landmark holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.266 Following the 
colonial experience, the Fifth United States Congress enacted the 
Sedition Act of 1798 for the fledgling American democracy.267 Legal 
scholars note that the Sedition Act was ultimately a failure because the 
First Amendment—in guaranteeing freedom of speech—assures that 
Americans have “an indestructible right [to voice] political criticism.”268 
Similarly, Poland has moderately maintained its Soviet era criminal 
defamation and insult laws, and the country is still arguably an emerging 
democracy when viewed by perennial democratic stalwarts that 
champion free speech.269 In both the early American and Polish 
experiences with democracy, the use of criminal law for defamation was 
employed as a mechanism “to protect a new, fragile form of 
government” from injurious public dissent.270 
Realistically, Poland is unlikely to embrace the American approach to 
defamation law because the United States “continue[s] to develop a 
distinctively different vision of freedom of expression” when compared 
to the principles and methods applied in European courts.271 The crux of 
this distinction between the American and European courts is the 
European courts’ strong interest in “a person’s right to protection of his 
or her reputation . . . as being part of the right to respect for private 
life.”272 In contrast, the United States Supreme Court barred an 
individual’s harmed reputation from being brought to court under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as plaintiffs and their 
  
 266. See generally New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) 
(outlining American defamation law, which “delimits a State’s power to award damages 
for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct”). 
 267. Lisby, supra note 60, at 458. 
 268. Id. at 459. 
 269. See Sadurski, supra note 8, at 439. 
 270. Yanchukova, supra note 20, at 869. 
 271. Perry Keller, Re-Opening the Door to the First Amendment, 5 AMSTERDAM 
L.F. 115, 115 (2013). Nonetheless, American First Amendment jurisprudence has 
“become a significant point of reference in political and legal debate in Europe” because 
of the “gap[s] left by European supranational courts and law makers.” Id. at 116. 
 272. Pfeifer v. Austria, App. No. 12556/03, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 182–83 (2007). 
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respective reputations are not deprived of liberty or property interests in 
a simple defamation action.273 
ii. The British Approach 
Although British and American law are based on the common law, the 
two legal systems diverge from one another because of the broad 
interpretation of the First Amendment and the New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan holding with the application of an actual malice standard that is 
applied in cases involving public officials and public figures.274 Burden 
shifting between the parties of a defamation lawsuit is dissimilar in the 
United Kingdom because the defendant, not the plaintiff, must first prove 
the truth of his statement, whereas a plaintiff in the United States must 
initially prove the falsity of the alleged defamatory statement.275 
Therefore, both countries’ defamation regimes must be analyzed 
separately as potential solutions to the Polish criminal defamation and 
insult laws.276 
The British system will likely pose additional procedural issues for 
Poland than it currently has with its criminal liability for defamation and 
insult because of the internal and external pressures the United Kingdom 
has endured due to the issue of libel tourism.277 Prior to 2013, the United 
Kingdom’s laws regarding civil defamation had produced a “seriously 
chilling effect” by allowing foreign claimants to file lawsuits against 
citizen critics or journalists.278 This provoked foreign jurisdictions such 
as the United States to respond with legislative enactment and bar 
English libel judgments from having a binding judicial effect in the 
United States.279 
  
 273. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). 
 274. Bates, supra note 204, at 241. 
 275. Id. at 246; see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267, 282–
83 (1964) (striking down an Alabama law that declared a publication was “libelous per 
se” if it harmed a person’s reputation or brought him into public contempt, and the 
Supreme Court shifted the initial burden onto the plaintiff to show the publication in 
question was circulated with actual malice). 
 276. See Bates, supra note 204, at 241. 
 277. See id. at 234. 
 278. Lord Lester, supra note 98, at 136. 
 279. Id. 
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However, the British Parliament enacted a defamation law reform 
titled the 2013 Defamation Act, adding the defense of reasonable belief 
with respect to making a statement “on a matter of public interest.”280 
The British defamation reform statute also curtails libel tourism in that 
an action for defamation is within British jurisdiction only when 
“England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place” to hear the 
case.281 Under this reform, however, an individual domiciled in a 
European Union or Lugano Convention country remains subject to a 
defamation suit from a plaintiff who lodges a complaint against the 
individual defendant in the United Kingdom.282 This reform nonetheless 
narrowed British court jurisdiction in defamation suits against individual 
defendants in other foreign jurisdictions, such as the United States.283 
While it appears “the worst of libel tourism is over,”284 the defamation 
law overhaul has still led to an increased number of cases brought before 
British courts, particularly statements made over the Internet.285 British 
defamation law continues to “put[] the onus on the defendant to prove 
that the statement at issue was true” as opposed to placing the burden of 
proof on the plaintiff who initially brought the action to prove that the 
statement was false.286 Therefore, the British defamation system would 
likely continue to hinder the Polish press, as the British system 
notoriously “mak[es] it easier to sue news outlets,” which would in turn 
further the potential of fostering self-censorship in Poland.287 
  
 280. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4(1)(a) (Eng.). 
 281. Id. § 9(2). 
 282. Id. § 9(1)(b)–(c), (5) (stating contracting parties to the Lugano Convention 
include the European Union Member States in addition to Iceland, Norway, and 
Switzerland). 
 283. See id. § 9(1)(a)–(c).  
 284. Jeff John Roberts, Privacy Laws Pose New Threat to Free Speech, FORTUNE 
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 285. See United Kingdom, FREEDOM HOUSE, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/united-kingdom (last visited Feb. 
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 286. Tom Kludt, Donald Trump Says he Wants Libel Laws More like the UK’s, 
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 287. See id. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Criminal liability for defamation has no place in countries that 
advocate democratic ideas and values because freedom of expression 
guarantees individuals the right to participate in the political process, to 
hear adverse opinions, and to voice their own opinions.288 As the 
European Court of Human Rights once observed, “Freedom of 
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, 
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of 
every man.”289 A democratic state ceases to exist each time a 
governmental entity imposes disproportionate and inconsistent 
restrictions or penalties on information or ideas articulated by citizens, 
regardless of whether those statements are perceived favorably or 
unfavorably.290 
Although the European Court of Human Rights has not yet expressly 
condemned the application of criminal liability for defamation291 because 
of the Court’s strong desire to protect and maintain an individual’s 
reputation,292 these personal interests can be equally protected through 
the use of private law and without the use of criminal penalties.293 While 
protecting an individual’s reputation must be recognized, this duty may 
still be effectively remedied by ensuring the tort of defamation is 
accessible to harmed plaintiffs.294 The undemocratic features of 
defamation prosecutions largely outweigh the benefits because of the 
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slightest threat of self-censorship.295 Self-censorship creates a metaphoric 
iron cage because citizens, specifically the media,296 perceive its 
application as a mechanism to suppress and punish criticism of the 
government297 along with weakening the press’s “powers of investigation 
and . . . dissemination of information to large audiences.”298 
Poland should adopt a system of defamation law similar to that of 
Ireland299 or, to a limited extent, the United Kingdom.300 The Irish 
defamation system embodies a statutory scheme that mandates the 
plaintiff, primarily public officials, to prove more than a harmed 
reputation in order to obtain a judgment against the defendant.301 
Subsequently, limiting defamation to civil judgments would allow for a 
freer flow of information and debate that more directly aligns with the 
objective of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.302 
More importantly, abolishing criminal defamation sanctions in Poland 
decreases the potential for “a ‘chilling effect’ on debates on matters of 
legitimate public interest.”303 Civil judgments do not carry the same 
egregious consequences on a defendant’s professional life304 because a 
defendant is not stamped with the same harmful social stigma following 
a civil judgment as opposed to when a criminal conviction is rendered.305 
Thus, there is a “clear civil remedy” alternative in defamation cases 
  
 295. See Thorgeirsdottir, supra note 140, at 398. 
 296. Id. 
 297. See Lisby, supra note 60, at 482. 
 298. Stephen J. A. Tierney, Press Freedom and Public Interest: The Developing 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 4 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 419, 
420 (1998). 
 299. See generally Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) § 35 (Ir.), 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2009/act/31/enacted/en/pdf. 
 300. See generally Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 1(1) (Eng.) (defining a “serious 
harm” with respect to a claimant in a civil action). The British system is proposed here 
simply because it redresses defamation similar to that of Ireland (i.e., civil litigation), not 
because the British system is necessarily ideal for Poland to adopt. Adoption of the 
British system is limited to the fact that its courts render only civil judgments against 
defendants in defamation actions; procedural issues remain problematic with the British 
system because the initial burden of proof to prove the truthfulness of the statement is 
with the defendant. See Kludt, supra note 286. 
 301. See BRÜGGEMEIER, CIACCHI & O’CALLAGHAN, supra note 179, at 264. 
 302. See The Convention, supra note 79, art. 10(1). 
 303. MCGONAGLE, supra note 114, at 24. 
 304. See id. at 60. 
 305. See Ball, supra note 260, at 139. 
624 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 26.3
“unlike pedophilia or other [serious] criminal charges,” where alternative 
legal remedies for defendants are undoubtedly lacking.306 Commenting 
on criminal liability for defamation, Justice William Douglas of the 
United States Supreme Court once observed, “It is disquieting to know 
that one of [criminal libel’s] instruments of destruction is abroad in the 
land today.”307 Freedom of expression should be suppressed only to the 
extent that “it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an 
inseparable part of it.”308 By recognizing prosecutions for defamation, an 
individual’s basic guarantee to freedom of expression would be rendered 
almost unrecognizable.309
306. Chapman, supra note 91, at 601. 
307. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 83 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). In 
making this assertion, Justice Douglas was commenting on the fact that some American 
jurisdictions continue to apply criminal liability for libel actions. Id.
308. Id. at 82 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting)). 
309. Id. at 80. 
